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0929-6646/Copyright ª 2014, ElsevierBackground/Purpose: The study describes a proactive infection control approach to prevent
nosocomial transmission of vancomycin-resistant enterococci (VRE) and tests if this approach
is effective for controlling multiple-drug resistant organisms in a nonendemic setting.
Methods: In response to the increasing prevalence of VRE in Hong Kong since 2011, we adopted
a multifaceted assertive approach in our health care network. This included active surveillance
culture, extensive contact tracing, directly observed hand hygiene in conscious patients before
they received meals and medications, stringent hand hygiene and environmental cleanliness,
and an immediate feedback antimicrobial stewardship program. We report the occurrence of
VRE outbreaks in our hospital after institution of these measures and compared with the con-
current occurrence in other public hospitals in Hong Kong.
Results: Between July 1, 2011 and November 13, 2013, VRE was identified in 0.32% (50/15,851)
of admission episodes by active surveillance culture. The risk of VRE carriage was three times
higher in patients with a history of hospitalization outside our hospital networks in the past 3
months (0.56% vs. 0.17%; p Z 0.001) compared with those who were not. Extensive contacthave no conflicts of interest relevant to this article.
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Measures to prevent nosocomial transmission of VRE 735tracing involving 3277 patient episodes was performed in the investigation for the 25 VRE index
patients upon whom implementation of contact precautions was delayed (more than 48 hours
of hospitalization). One episode of VRE outbreak was identified in our hospital network,
compared with the 77 VRE outbreaks reported in the other hospital networks (controls)
without these proactive infection control measures.
Conclusion: Our multifaceted assertive proactive infection control approach can minimize the
nosocomial transmission and outbreak of VRE in a nonendemic area.
Copyright ª 2014, Elsevier Taiwan LLC & Formosan Medical Association. All rights reserved.Introduction
Vancomycin-resistant Enterococcus (VRE) has become a
major nosocomial pathogen in many parts of the world
since its first report in Europe in 1987.1e6 In North America,
there was a significant increase of VRE from 0.3% of all
isolates in 1989 to over 28% in 2004.7,8 VRE survives on the
hands of health care workers (HCWs) and in hardy envi-
ronments for up to 1 hour and 4 months, respectively,9,10
which may have contributed to the global dissemination
of VRE in the health care setting.11
In Hong Kong, we have been vigilant against emerging
and re-emerging pathogens after the outbreak of SARS in
2003.12,13 Hand hygiene practice, with an emphasis on
directly observed hand hygiene, has demonstrated much
success in the prevention and control of nosocomial out-
breaks of viruses,14e17 and multiple drug resistant organ-
isms (MDROs) including methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus
aureus,18 carbapenemase-producing Enterobacteriaceae,19
and VRE20 in our health care network.
However, an increasing number of sporadic cases of VRE
is observed in Hong Kong and has caused nosocomial out-
breaks since the 4th quarter of 2010. To prevent nosocomial
VRE transmission in our health care network, which in-
cludes transplantation and oncology service, proactive
infection control measures using a combination of active
surveillance culture, early single room isolation and strict
contact precautions, directly observed hand hygiene prac-
tice in HCWs and conscious patients, environmental disin-
fection, and extensive contact tracing to identify secondary
cases was introduced. These proactive infection control
measures are particularly important in our hospital network
because immunocompromised patients have the highest
reported risk of VRE bacteremia and associated mortality
after gastrointestinal colonization of VRE.21,22 VRE
outbreak has also led to temporary closure of intensive care
units and oncology service.23e25 We aim to minimize noso-
comial transmission of VRE in our hospital network by
implementation of the proactive infection control mea-
sures, while gauging our performance by comparing the
occurrence of VRE outbreaks in other public hospitals in
Hong Kong as control.
Materials and methods
Laboratory diagnosis of VRE
Rectal swabs with visible fecal components were collected
and sent to microbiology laboratory on the same day forVRE screening. These specimens were inoculated onto
chromogenic agar (chromID VRE, BioMe´rieux, Marcy-
l’E´toile, France) and were incubated aerobically at 35C for
48 hours. All enterococci were identified to species level by
the commercial Vitek Gram-positive identification card
(BioMe´rieux), motility and colonial pigment production.
The KirbyeBauer disk diffusion method and E-test (AB
Biodisk, Solna, Sweden) were used to determine the anti-
microbial susceptibility of the enterococci according to the
Clinical and Laboratory Standards Institute or the manu-
facturer’s instructions. Isolates with potential vancomycin
resistance were confirmed by polymerase chain reaction as
previously described.26
Epidemiology of VRE in our hospital network
Our hospital network includes a 1600-bed tertiary referral
university-affiliated acute hospital, Queen Mary Hospital
(Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, China), and
three other extended-care hospitals (hospitals M, P, and Q)
with another 1600 beds. In response to the increasing
prevalence of VRE in Hong Kong, an active surveillance
culture program was initiated in our network. The active
surveillance culture was described as the “whom TO screen
model”, as previously described,19,26 taking the acronym of
T as history of medical tourism with hospitalization outside
Hong Kong, and O as history of receiving surgical operation
outside Hong Kong, within the past 12 months prior to
admission. Patients with a history of admissions to local
hospitals other than Queen Mary Hospital in the past 3
months were also included in the active surveillance.
Rectal swabs were collected from patients, who fulfilled
the aforementioned criteria, to identify patients with
asymptomatic gastrointestinal VRE carriage. This study was
conducted between July 1, 2011 and November 13, 2013
with approval by the institutional review board. To under-
stand the epidemiology of VRE among patients with and
without risk factors in our hospital network and our com-
munity, universal admission screening of VRE was per-
formed in all acute medical admissions for 50 days (from
September 25, 2013 to November 13, 2013).
Proactive infection control measures for VRE
The hospital information system was screened during
weekdays by the infection control team (ICT) to identify
newly admitted patients fulfilling criteria for VRE
screening. Telephone reminders to frontline staff were
provided by ICT when rectal swab was not collected from
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proactive infection control measures, during infectious
disease consultation service, clinical microbiologists would
request additional VRE screening for patients transferred
from other local hospitals with an ongoing VRE outbreak
announced by the Centre for Health Protection, Depart-
ment of Health, Hong Kong, especially those treated with
broad spectrum antibiotics, such as vancomycin, extended-
spectrum b-lactameb-lactamase inhibitors, and carbape-
nem groups of antibiotics, regardless of any initial negative
VRE admission screening by rectal swabs. ICT was notified
when suspected VRE isolates were detected from CHRO-
Magar screening of rectal swabs or other clinical specimens
such as urine, sputum, wound swab, sterile body fluid, or
blood culture.
ICT assessed all VRE-positive patients at bedside to
recommend and monitor appropriate infection control
measures. Extensive contact tracing for secondary cases was
performed when a VRE index patient hospitalized for more
than 48 hours was identified. Extensive contact tracing
included the entire period of hospitalization of the index
patient, covering all potentially exposed patients. Immedi-
ate VRE screening was conducted in all potentially exposed
patients who were still hospitalized within our hospital
network. Discharged exposed patients were labeled as “VRE
contact patients” in the hospital computer system by ICT,
which serves to alert VRE screening upon hospital read-
mission in these patients. For exposed patients discharged to
residential care homes for elderly (RCHE), site visit and
collection of rectal swabs were done by the community
geriatric assessment teams within 1 week. These teams,
comprised of geriatricians, nurses, and allied health pro-
fessionals, provide regular on-site visits, comprehensive
medical follow-up and recommendations on infection con-
trol measures at the RCHE within our health care region.27 If
a secondary VRE-positive casewas confirmed in the RCHE, all
residents in that RCHE would be screened for asymptomatic
gastrointestinal carriage of VRE.
Nosocomial outbreak was defined as three or more lab-
oratory confirmed cases of hospital-acquired VRE with an
epidemiological link in the same ward. The source of VRE
nosocomial transmission was investigated by ICT to identify
areas for improvement.
Directly observed hand hygiene in patients was pro-
moted as a new core infection control component. Alcohol-
based handrub was delivered to all conscious patients
immediately before meals and medications. Alcohol foam
and handrub was also made available in patient’s toilets.
Patients were encouraged to disinfect toilet seats before
use and to clean hands after toileting. When a bedpan was
used, a wet tissue was provided to patients for wiping
hands, followed by directly observed hand hygiene using
alcohol-based handrub applied by health care assistants.
“出入口管制”, meaning “entry and exit control”, was the
slogan for this campaign to highlight the key measures in
breaking the fecaleoral transmission of VRE during mouth
cleansing or dispensing meals, nasogastric, or gastrostomy
tube feeds and medications. Emphasis on hand hygiene
using an alcohol-based handrub among HCWs in our hospital
network, with ongoing regular audits, continued as previ-
ously described.28 The consumption data of alcohol-based
hand rub retrieved from the pharmacy was calculated interms of L/1000 patient-days. Environmental cleaning of
clinical areas was performed by supporting staff according
to the hospital protocol, whereas ICT conducted teaching
and regular audit of environment cleanliness.
Open staff forum and special education sessions were
arranged by ICT. “Road shows” on the importance of
infection control measures, especially on the practice of
“entry and exit control”, took place in all of the wards,
providing an opportunity to meet the frontline HCWs at
their handover meeting between morning and afternoon
work shifts. Uninformed visits were also made to clinical
areas by infection control nurses to detect any lapse in
infection control practice.
An antibiotic stewardship program was conducted ac-
cording to the established protocol,29 and the consumption
of broad spectrum antibiotics with potential for selecting
MDROs including cefotaxime, ceftriaxone, ceftazidime,
cefepime, piperacillin, cefoperazone/sulbactam, piper-
acillinetazobactam, ticarcillineclavulanate, meropenem,
imipenemecilastatin, vancomycin, linezolid (intravenous/
per os), ciprofloxacin (intravenous/per os), levofloxacin
(intravenous/per os), moxifloxacin (intravenous/per os),
and ofloxacin (intravenous/per os) in the specialties of
intensive care and high dependency units, medicine,
oncology, orthopedic surgery, and surgery was described.
Nosocomial outbreak of VRE in Hong Kong as a
concurrent control
In Hong Kong, there are seven hospital networks comprising
42 public hospitals under the management of Hospital Au-
thority serving over 90% of the local population of 7 million.
Outbreaks with public health impact were reported to the
Hospital Authority and a press release with relevant infor-
mation would be uploaded to the Hospital Authority News
Centre for public access as previously described.16 Detailed
descriptions of each VRE outbreak were retrieved from the
Hospital Authority News Centre (http://www.ha.org.hk/
visitor/ha_visitor/). The number of nosocomial outbreaks
of VRE in all seven hospital networks between July 1, 2011
and November 13, 2013 was recorded as concurrent control.
Statistical analysis
Chi-square test, Fisher’s exact test, or t test, was used
where appropriate. A p-value  0.05 was considered to be
statistically significant. Computation was performed using
the SPSS version 18.0 for Windows, IBM Corporation, New
York, USA.
Results
Epidemiology of VRE in our hospital network
A total of 68 patients were positive for Enterococcus fae-
cium, of which 66 patients had fecal carriage and two pa-
tients had VRE first isolated from urine specimens during
our study period. There were 41 male and 27 female pa-
tients with a median age of 72 years (range, 12e96 years).
Prevalence of VRE among patient groups of active
Measures to prevent nosocomial transmission of VRE 737surveillance culture in our hospital network is illustrated in
Table 1. Overall, VRE was identified in 0.32% (50/15,851) of
admission episodes under our active surveillance program.
The risk of VRE carriage was two to three times higher in
patients with a history of hospitalization outside Hong Kong
in the past 12 months (0.46% vs. 0.17%, p Z 0.018), and
outside our hospital networks in the past 3 months (0.56%
vs. 0.17%, p Z 0.001). Extensive contact tracing were
performed in 25 index patients with identification of VRE
carriage or infection after 48 hours of hospitalization. Of
3277 patient episodes screened for VRE (average 131 pa-
tient episodes were traced per 1 index VRE patient), 18
(0.55%) were VRE positive, which included a cluster of 10
secondary cases, as previously described,26 occurred in the
early phase of our control program. The incidence of
nosocomial acquisition of VRE had significantly decreased
from 0.46 per 10,000 patient-days in the early phase
(JulyeDecember 2011) of the control program, to 0.10 per
10,000 patient-days in the remaining phase (from January
2012 to November 13, 2013), (p < 0.001 under Poisson as-
sumptions). Overall, 1300 (39.7%) of 3277 patient episodesTable 1 Prevalence of vancomycin-resistant enterococci
(VRE) among different patient groups of active surveillance
culture in our hospital network.
Active surveillance culturea Prevalence of VRE
(1) Episodes of patient fulfilling
“whom TO screen” criteriab
10/2175 (0.46%)
(2) Episodes of patient directly
transfer-in from local hospitals
outside our hospital network
6/1557 (0.39%)
(3) Episodes of patient with history of
hospitalization from local
hospitals outside our hospital
networks in the past 3 monthsc
22/3907 (0.56%)
(4) Episodes of patient with history of
hospitalization within our hospital
networks in the past 3 monthsd
12/6891 (0.17%)
(5) Episodes of patient referred from
residential care home for elderly
and without history of
hospitalization in the past
3 monthse
0/240
(6) Episodes of patient referred from
home and without history of
hospitalization in the past
3 monthse
0/1081
a Including those patients with delay collection of screening
specimens after 48 hours of hospitalization.
b “Whom TO screen” model, taking the acronym of T as a
history of medical tourism with hospitalization outside Hong
Kong, and O as a history of receiving surgical operation outside
Hong Kong, within the past 12 months prior to admission.
c 3907 episodes admitted from 29 local hospitals outside our
hospital network. The median time between previous hospital
discharge and present admission was 26 days (0e91 days).
d Themedian timebetween previous hospital discharge fromour
hospital network and present admission was 9 days (0e91 days).
e Data from universal VRE screening to all acute medical
admission for 50 days (from September 25, 2013 to November
13, 2013).were screened during the same hospitalization, 1710
(52.2%) were screened upon readmission, and 267 (8.1%)
were screened at the RCHE. None of the elderly screened in
residential care homes was VRE positive.
Nosocomial transmission of VRE occurred in nine (36%) of
the 25 episodes of extensive contact tracing (Table 2).
Delayed isolation of VRE-positive index cases was signifi-
cantly associated with the occurrence of nosocomial
transmission (Table 3). In one episode (episode 16 in Table
2), the rectal swab for VRE culture was “falsely” negative
on admission screening, but VRE carriage status was sub-
sequently revealed in a repeated rectal swab requested by
clinical microbiologist during consultation service, resulting
in a 14-day delay in the patient’s isolation. Contact tracing
was not performed in the other 25 VRE-positive patients
who were identified and isolated with strict contact pre-
cautions within 48 hours of hospitalization.
Proactive infection control measures for VRE
VRE-positive patients were isolated in single rooms for
strict contact precautions. Cohort nursing in open ward
area was not allowed. Dedicated medical equipment was
provided for VRE-positive patients. HCWs were required to
wear gloves and gowns, and to comply with hand hygiene
practice using alcohol-based handrub during patient care.
The overall compliance of hand hygiene was maintained
at 73.9e78.6% with the consumption of alcohol-based
handrub at a volume of 42.4 L/1000 patient-days (2011)
to 49.6 L/1000 patient-days (2013, 1ste3rd quarter).
Two open staff forums were conducted with 216 atten-
dances, and two special education sessions were arranged
for senior nursing staff and infection control linked nurses.
A total of 60 road shows were organized to 60 wards to
ensure that infection control measures, especially the
slogan of “entry and exit control” were delivered to our
frontline HCWs. More than 350 posters were displayed in
the clinical areas and patients’ toilet facilities, and 283
toilet seat disinfectors were installed distributed over 46
wards’ toilets. Information sheets were given to all patients
upon admission to empower patients on performing hand
hygiene and personal hygiene during hospitalization.
Environmental cleaning of clinical areas, especially
toilet facilities and frequently touched areas, such as bed
rails and bed tables, were disinfected with 1000 ppm so-
dium hypochlorite at least once daily in the general wards,
and twice daily in the isolation rooms where VRE-positive
patients were nursed. Four teaching sessions were held for
the supporting staff, with audited compliance of environ-
mental cleaning being over 80%.
The consumption of broad spectrum antibiotics with a
potential for selecting MDROs, expressed by divided daily
dose per 1000 acute patient-bed-days, increased gradually
from 150 (2011 3rd quarter) to 205 (2013 3rd quarter).
Nosocomial outbreak of VRE in Hong Kong as a
concurrent control
Between July 1, 2011 and November 13, 2013, 78 VRE
outbreaks were reported in the public hospitals in Hong
Kong. VRE outbreaks predominantly occurred in medical
Table 2 Epidemiological characteristics of nine episodes of extensive contact tracing with identification of secondary cases
with vancomycin-resistant enterococci (VRE) isolated in our hospital network.
Episode of
secondary
case
identified
in
extensive
contact
tracinga
Sex/
age, y
Clinical
specimen
(colonization
vs. infection)
Specialty ward/hospital (date
of investigation)/underlying
diseases
Possible source of
VRE acquisition
Duration
between
admission
and patient
isolation in
single room
with strict
contact
precautions
N (%) of secondary
cases positive for
VRE/number of
contact tracing
1b M/74 Rectal swab
(colonization)
Surgical ward / hospital M
(December 2011)/
hepatocellular carcinoma
From Hospital B
outside our
hospital network
3 days before
admission
21 daysc 10 (2.6)/381
5 M/80 Rectal swab
(colonization)
Respiratory ward/hospital P
(July 2012) / COPD
Within our hospital
network
20 days 1 (5.6)/18
8 M/80 Rectal swab
(colonization)
Orthopedic ward/QMH
(January 2013)/HT, CVA,
fracture right NOF
Within our hospital
network
15 days 1 (0.6)/180
10 M/76 Rectal swab
(colonization)
Medical ward/QMH (May 2013)/
AF, COPD, CVA
From Hospital B
outside our
hospital network
13 days before
admission
4 days 1 (1.4)/71
11 F/79 Midstream
urine
(colonization)
Medical ward/QMH (May 2013)/
CRF, HT, colonic tumor,
lymphoma
Within our hospital
network
5 days 1 (1)/102
12 F/93 Rectal swab
(colonization)
Geriatric ward/hospital Q (May
2013)/AF, CVA, HT
From Hospital H
outside our
hospital network
7 days before
admission
7 days 1 (1.6)/61
16 M/48 Rectal swab
(colonization)
Medical ward/QMH (August
2013)/HCV related cirrhosis
Directly
transferred from
Hospital I outside
our hospital
network
14 daysd 1 (0.6)/174
18 F/81 Midstream
urine
(colonization)
Medical ward/QMH (August
2013)/glaucoma, HT
Within our hospital
network
10 days 1 (1)/96
21 F/74 Rectal swab
(colonization)
Geriatric ward/hospital Q
(September 2013)/AF, DM, HT,
dementia, parkinsonism
Within our hospital
network
22 days 1 (1)/100
AF Z atrial fibrillation; COPD Z chronic obstructive pulmonary disease; CRF Z chronic renal failure; CVA Z cardiovascular accident;
DM Z diabetic mellitus; HCV Z hepatitis C virus; HT Z hypertension; NOF Z neck of femur; QMH Z Queen Mary Hospital.
a A total of 25 episodes of extensive contact tracing were performed and the remaining 16 episodes traced without secondary VRE
cases were not listed.
b Detail of this nosocomial outbreak was published previously (26).
c Patient died on the date of VRE identification.
d Rectal swab for VRE culture was falsely negative upon admission screening, and the VRE carriage was subsequently identified by a
repeat rectal swab (after combination therapy with cefotaxime for 8 days, oral levofloxacin for 7 days, and piperacilinetazobactam for
4 days) requested by clinical microbiologist upon infectious disease consultation service.
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breaks, 19.2%), surgical units (11 outbreaks, 14.1%), and
orthopedic units (6 outbreaks, 7.7%). A total of 720 patients
were involved in the 78 VRE outbreaks. The median number
of affected patients in the VRE outbreaks was seven (range,3e39 patients). There was an increasing trend of VRE
outbreak during the study period where the number of re-
ported VRE outbreaks increased from three (2011 3rd
quarter) to eight (2013 1st quarter) to 18 (2013 2nd quarter),
peaking at 20 (2013 3rd quarter). Our hospital network had
Table 3 Epidemiological characteristics of index patients
with or without nosocomial transmission of vancomycin-
resistant enterococci (VRE) in the hospitals.
Index VRE
patients
resulted in
nosocomial
transmission
(n Z 9)
Index VRE
patients
without
nosocomial
transmission
(n Z 16)
p
Age, y 76  12.3 66  15.7 0.126
Male sex 5 (56) 9 (56) 0.973
Presence of indwelling device
Nasogastric tube 1 (11.1) 1 (6.3) 0.667
Tracheostomy tube 0 2 (12.5) 0.269
Chronic wound or ulcer 3 (33.3) 2 (12.5) 0.211
Urinary catheter 5 (55.6) 3 (18.8) 0.058
Drain 1 (11.1) 2 (12.5) 0.918
Underlying diseases
Chronic cerebral
conditions
4 (44.4) 2 (12.5) 0.073
Chronic cardiac
conditions
5 (55.6) 6 (37.5) 0.383
Chronic pulmonary
conditions
2 (22.2) 1 (6.3) 0.238
Chronic renal failure 0 3 (18.8) 0.166
Liver cirrhosis 1 (11.1) 3 (18.8) 0.617
Diabetes mellitus 1 (11.1) 3 (18.8) 0.617
Malignancy 2 (22.2) 3 (18.8) 0.835
Use of antibiotic 90 d before admission
b-lactameb-lactamase
inhibitors
8 (88.9) 12 (75) 0.405
Cephalosporin 3 (33.3) 6 (37.5) 0.835
Carbapenem 0 1 (6.3) 0.444
Fluoroquinolones 3 (33.3) 5 (31.1) 0.915
Time to implementation
of single room
isolation with strict
contact precautions,
mean  SD, d
13.1  7.0 5.4  3.6 0.001
Data are presented as n (%) or mean  SD.
SD Z standard deviation.
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occurred in an extended care hospital (Hospital M) in the 4th
quarter of 2011. With the enforcement of proactive infec-
tion control measures, no further VRE outbreaks were re-
ported in our hospital network despite the increasing VRE
outbreaks reported in other public hospitals.
Discussion
Our results illustrate that our proactive infection control
approach is effective in minimizing nosocomial transmission
and outbreaks of VRE as only one (1.3%) out of the 78 re-
ported VRE nosocomial outbreaks, occurred in our health
care network within 28 months in Hong Kong. Because our
hospital network served as a tertiary referral center, almost
50% of patient admission episodes subjected to VRE
screening had either a recent history of hospitalizationoutside Hong Kong or outside our hospital network. Patients
with recent exposure to health care settings outside our
hospital network had a significantly higher chance of
gastrointestinal VRE carriage upon admission screening,
suggesting that “search and confine” of VRE carriers is a key
measure to limit importation of VRE in our hospitals. Our
findings suggest that delayed recognition of VRE carriers
and delayed implementation of single room isolation and
strict contact precautions are significantly associated with
the nosocomial transmission, as room sharing with patient
colonized or infected with VRE was found to be a risk factor
associated with VRE acquisition.30 In addition, the unique
feature of directly observed hand hygiene, “entry and exit
control”, and extensive contact tracing for potential sec-
ondary VRE cases in our control program contributed to
minimizing the incidence of nosocomial acquisition of VRE
to 0.1/10,000 patient-days, which was much lower than
that in the acute care settings of three other teaching
hospitals employing strict infection control measures based
on the guidelines of the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention.31
However, our extensive active surveillance culture and
contact tracing approach has some constraints. The iden-
tification of gastrointestinal carriage of VRE is affected by
the intrinsic limitations of rectal swab culture, where a
poor sensitivity is noted when the density of VRE is lower
than 4 log colony forming units/g of stool.32 This may result
in a false negative VRE carriage status, especially in pa-
tients who are not receiving broad spectrum antibiotic
treatment. Previous studies demonstrated that the use of
broad spectrum antibiotics increases the microbial load of
MDROs and unmasked the carriage status.33e35 Moreover, a
biological false negative VRE screening result may be
related to the gastrointestinal transit time, where 48e72
hours is required for the passage of VRE from oral acquisi-
tion to the rectum.36 If an index patient acquired VRE just
prior to interhospital transfer, VRE would not be detected
by rectal swab upon admission to the receiving hospital on
the same day. In fact, the rectal swab in one of our VRE
index patients (extensive contact tracing episode 16) did
not detect VRE on admission. Therefore additional VRE
control protocols must be introduced.
Our experience showed that the memorable slogan of
“entry and exit control” to highlight the key measures to
staff and patients in order to break the fecaleoral trans-
mission of VRE is helpful. Extensive environmental
contamination was reported in patients with gastrointes-
tinal VRE, which may lead to nosocomial transmission of
VRE with a median of 5 days.37 Although the implementa-
tion of bleach-based cleaningedisinfection program was
associated with marked reductions in nosocomial acquisi-
tion of VRE,38 frequently touched surfaces, such as hospital
curtains between bed space, are difficult to disinfect and
are rapidly re-contaminated.39 Therefore, directly
observed hand hygiene using alcohol-based handrub in pa-
tients just before meals and medications remains a simple
and practical measure to reduce oral acquisition of VRE in
hospital. Similarly, promotion of personal hygiene in toilet
facilities can help to reduce VRE acquisition from occult
VRE carriers who use shared toilet facilities.
Unlike the USA, where there is a large community
reservoir of VRE,40 the burden of VRE is still limited in Hong
740 V.C.-C. Cheng et al.Kong. In a 50-day universal surveillance of VRE among pa-
tients in acute medical wards by means of admission
screening, patients without a recent history of hospitali-
zation were all VRE-negative. Universal surveillance culture
in acute medical wards was conducted because almost 50%
of nosocomial VRE outbreaks were reported in medical
departments. More importantly, VRE was rarely detected in
livestock animals in China and avoparcin is not used in food
animals in this region.41 Therefore, person-to-person
transmission is the main source of nosocomial dissemina-
tion of VRE, and infection control measures within hospitals
are of utmost importance. Our proactive infection control
measures overcame the selective pressure of increasing
antibiotic usage as a result of the increasing number of
MDROs.42,43
There are several limitations in this study. Firstly,
although the epidemiological characteristics of index pa-
tients with and without nosocomial transmission of VRE
were sought, we did not address the risk factors for noso-
comial acquisition of VRE among contact patients in this
particular study. Nonetheless, risk factors for nosocomial
VRE acquisition among contact patients were reported in
our previous studies.20,26 Secondly, the sequential intro-
duction of additional control measures over 2 years com-
plicates data analysis. However, we demonstrated a
decreasing incidence of nosocomial acquisition of VRE
during the study period. All public hospitals in Hong Kong
adopted our proactive infection control approach from
November 13, 2013, especially the active surveillance cul-
ture, in view of our success in the control of nosocomial VRE
transmission in our hospital network. Further investigation
is warranted to evaluate the outcome of VRE control after
the implementation of proactive infection control measures
in all public hospitals in Hong Kong.
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